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INJUSTICE, INEQUALITY AND ETHICS. By Robin Barrow. Totowa, 
New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books. 1982. Pp. xii, 204. $26.50. 
For thousands of years, philosophers have searched for the magic 
formula for a universally acceptable system of moral imperatives. 
Nonetheless, the problem of practical ethics, which searches for an-
swers to actual moral questions, continues to press. Joining current 
debates, Robin Barrow's useful, if not unique,1 book tackles ten hard 
fought questions of contemporary practical ethics with a hybrid 
brand of utilitarian philosophy. 
In Injustice, Inequality and Ethics, Barrow confronts a wide vari-
ety of moral questions ranging from abortion to democracy to vege-
tarianism. His prescriptions are these: Feminist language is not 
imperative; sex-role stereotyping in child-rearing is legitimate; re-
verse-discrimination is unjustified; abortion may not pose any moral 
problems, but, in any event, is a matter of individual choice; wealth 
should be evenly distributed; democracy is the preferable form of 
government; civil disobedience is defensible; humans may kill and 
eat animals, but should not make them suffer; art as expression 
should be subsidized, but, for the most part, not controlled by the 
state; and education should impart the skills necessary for living 
well. 
Barrow calls himself a utilitarian, writing unabashedly that utili-
tarianism is "the only satisfactory moral theory" (p. 10, emphasis ad-
ded). Surprisingly, then, he adopts a suspiciously non-utilitarian 
formulation of utilitarianism, which he acknowledges that he owes 
to John Rawls.2 
1. See, e.g., P. SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (1979); TODAY'S MORAL PROBLEMS (R. Was-
serstrom ed. 1975). 
2. P. 2(). Rawls' two principles of justice are: 
First Principle 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ... and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971). 
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Pure utilitarianism, as Barrow correctly explains, is a "conse-
quentialist" or result-sensitive ethical theory (p. 14). Traditionally, 
the utilitarians' goal is to provide the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number of people.3 Utilitarianism thus differs from ethical 
theories based on the writings of Immanuel Kant,4 whose views in-
fluenced Rawls.5 Kantian theories search for the logical underpin-
nings of morality, preliminary to spinning out specific prescriptions. 
For example, according to Kant, inherent in moral discourse is the 
notion that moral imperatives can be universalized. Kantian theo-
ries, because they depend on the formal characteristics of ethical dis-
course, resist the pressure of result orientation. Thus, such theories 
do not depend on the amount of happiness produced. 
Barrow's Rawlsian-sounding statement of utilitarianism forsakes 
a pure utilitarian focus on the production of human happiness. Hap-
piness for the greatest number remains the goal, but with the qualifi-
cation that "no policy is adopted that either ignores the claim to 
happiness of any individual or would make some happier at the ex-
pense of others" (p. 20). This hybrid utilitarianism reaches beyond 
the foundation of utilitarian theory and, in some circumstances, 
makes consequences irrelevant. Thus, Barrow implies that we cannot 
ignore or undervalue the interests of any human being even if to do 
so would produce the greatest good. 
Barrow's position is an attractive one. Such hybrid utilitarianism 
keeps the intuitively appealing focus on happiness and avoids 
utilitarian excesses illustrated by the scapegoat problem: Suppose 
that a citizenry terrorized by an atrocious crime can only be pacified 
(producing the greatest happiness) if someone is executed. When the 
true criminal cannot be found, an innocent person is selected, adver-
tised as the off ender, and killed. The result redounds to the greater 
good and is therefore consistent with pure utilitarian principles. The 
need to avoid the scapegoat problem has pushed Barrow to Kant 
and Rawls, but he offers no justification for his position other than 
its value in short-circuiting objections to utilitarianism.6 
Hybrid theories combining aspects of Kantian and utilitarian 
moral reasoning are not novel. R.M. Hare recently stated that moral 
reasoning includes a logical component - its tenets can be univer-
salized - and a substantial aspect consisting of human preference. 7 
3. See J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (0. Piest ed. 1953). 
4. See I. KANT, THE MORAL LAW (H. Paten trans. ed. 1956). 
5. See J. RAWLS, supra note 2, at viii (1971); P. SINGER, supra note 1, at 11. 
6. A utilitarian ground for such a rule is conceivable. It would depend on a judgment that 
no policy which ignores the rights of individuals will ever promote the greatest good. That, 
however, is not an argument Barrow makes, although he does adopt rule utilitarianism, in-
stead of its rival, act utilitarianism. See pp. 14-16. 
7. R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING 4 (1981) (reviewed in this issue). 
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Barrow seems to adopt this interesting method, but it is a fault and a 
disappointment of his work that he does not explore it. 
In the balance of the book, Barrow applies his framework to 
resolving a mix of ethical questions. "Animals," because its subject 
· is less familiar than the others he discusses, is one of the more inter-
esting chapters. Barrow is not the first to assert that humanity's per-
sistent failure to include animals in the measure of the greatest good 
is simple prejudice, that "speciesism"8 is no more defensible than 
racism (pp. 158-59). This is so, he thinks, because beings are morally 
significant if they have interests and the capacity to suffer. Animals 
can have both (p. 160).9 Because all suffering is bad, human beings 
behave immorally when they cause animals to &,uffer (p. 160). Bar-
row resists the logical conclusion that killing animals is wrong, as-
serting that killing animals does not necessarily cause physical 
suffering, nor, as with humans, the equally painful fear of death (pp. 
165-66). We may still eat steak, if we kill it kindly.Io 
The disturbing result of Barrow's view is that it deemphasizes the 
value of life. He resists placing a positive value on life itself because 
this approach might force the further conclusion that, in some cir-
cumstances, human beings have a duty to procreate (p. 165). 11 But 
whatever logical problems it may cause, one would be hard pressed 
to think of a proposition more universally held than that life is 
desirable. 
It is worth noting that Barrow's point that animals do not antici-
pate and therefore do not suffer from the fear of death may apply 
equally to incapacitated humans. I2 It is aL50 uncertain that animals 
suffer less from dying than do humans. Humans' painful anticipa-
tion and fear of death may be equalled by animals' painful lack of 
understanding of their circumstances. I3 
Barrow is most uncertain in the chapter called "Abortion." His 
"weak thesis" argues that abortion is morally justifiable, but permit-
ted only in "certain fairly limited circumstances" (pp. 104-05). Such 
circumstances would exist when providing sustenance to the fetus 
would itself cause great suffering (p. 102). Barrow, however, fails to 
8. See Singer, All Animals are Equal, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 103, 108, 116 n.5 
(1974) (attributing the term "speciesism" to Dr. Richard Ryder). 
9. Barrow concedes that some animals may have neither interests nor a capacity for suffer-
ing. He suggests, however, that the line defining beings fit for moral concern should lie be-
tween higher and lower forms of life rather than between humans and animals, Pp. 160-61. 
10. Barrow would probably resist this characterization. Although he says that "perhaps, in 
certain circumstances, it is justifiable to kill animals in order to eat them," he does not claim 
that this is necessarily so. P. 166. 
11. "I regard the essence of utilitarianism as being a moral requirement that we ensure as 
much happiness for all existing beings as possible, rather than that we should create as many 
happy beings as possible." P. 165. 
12. P. SINGER, supra note 1, at 75. 
13. Id at 53. 
February 1984] Legal Philosophy 787 
define the specific circumstances in which the mother's suffering 
would justify killing14 the fetus, and thus sidesteps the thorniest is-
sues in the abortion debate. Barrow concludes that "the complexity 
and uncertainty surrounding this issue" means the individual rather 
than the state must determine the proper course (p. 105). 
The weak thesis is based on the well-worn analogy of the rela-
tionship of mother and fetus: It is as if the mother "wakes to con-
sciousness one day to discover that a famous violinist has been 
plugged into her, in order that he may partake of such organs as her 
liver and heart .... " 15 This analogy, once accepted (and it need 
not be accepted since pregnancy, at least in some cases, is not en-
tirely unforeseen), is employed to argue that a mother's rights may 
allow her to choose to deny the fetus sustenance (p. 101). But, for 
utilitarians, rights only arise when they tend to produce the greatest 
good (p. 101). So, the utilitarian must ask whether the decision to 
end a dependent life serves the greatest good. Barrow terms this the 
weak thesis, since it is uncertain that utility will so consistently favor 
the mother's freedom to choose as to create a right to choose. One 
interesting point made in the course of this discussion is that decid-
ing whether a fetus is a person does not resolve the abortion di-
lemma, since we do, in some circumstances, allow the killing of 
persons (p. 93). 
The "strong thesis" is actually the weaker of the two. Again, Bar-
row relies on the notion that what is bad is suffering. Killing a fetus 
does not cause the fetus to suffer, because a fetus does not have the 
self-awareness required for suffering (pp. 102-03). Therefore, abor-
tion escapes the realm of moral discourse entirely (p. 102). The con-
clusion that abortion is not a moral issue because the fetus does not 
suffer disregards the powerful notion that life is valuable, and is so 
preposterous that it completely discredits Barrow's premise that suf-
fering is the key factor in the moral calculus. 
Barrow's discussion of feminist language in the chapter, "Femi-
nism: Language and Thought," is unconvincing because he consid-
ers and refutes only one of the arguments in its favor. To Barrow, 
the only issue is whether the speaker is thinking sexist thoughts and 
thus using sexist language to maintain the advantaged status of the 
male. If a speaker does not hold sexist views, then sexually stereo-
typical language is acceptable. The point is fair, but inconclusive, 
for Barrow ignores other arguments for using gender-neutral 
language. 
14. According to Barrow, "A primary question must be 'can killing ever be justified?', for 
whatever the exact status of the foetus, it seems certain that destroying it or removing it from 
the womb would amount to killing it." P. 93. 
15. P. 101. This analogy originated in Thompson, A .Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PuB. 
AFF. 47, 48-49 (1971). 
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Two examples from the book amply illustrate the thinness of 
Barrow's understanding. Homosexual men, he says, may be called 
"homosexuals," "queers," "pansies," "fairies," "faggots" or "gays." 
But, ''you cannot be sure about a particular person's attitude to ho-
mosexuality simply by knowing which term he prefers to use to refer 
to them" (p. 59). (The listener may not feel the need to be sure.) 
Similarly, there may be nothing wrong with calling a black man 
"boy" because the word does not necessarily indicate a paternalistic 
attitude (p. 61 ). One significant problem is that Barrow lightly dis-
misses the fact that regardless of the speaker's attitude, certain terms 
may be highly offensive to the listener. Moreover, he discredits the 
educational value of feminist language. 
Although we must continue to await the definitive resolution of 
moral questions, Barrow's book is still helpful. Like other similar 
works, it sparks moral self-examination. It is, however, marred by 
some unfortunate misjudgments. One lapse is temperament: The 
book's tone is arrogant to the point of being insulting. Second, the 
author's evident prejudices have made the book less than thorough. 
For example, Barrow ignores the impact of sexist la~guage on the 
listener. Priorities were also miscalculated, so that some difficult ar-
guments are slipshod or absent and other more obvious ones are 
overworked. One wonders, for example, how any author could 
devote equal space to the intuitive point that animals feel pain and 
the less evident notion that democracy is the best form of govern-
ment. Finally, Barrow's methodological approach is confused. 
Throughout the book the Kantian-utilitarian tension· is unresolved. 
With other excellent works on contemporary ethics available, Bar-
row's book is not the first that should be taken from the shelf. 
